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Abstract 
 
Far-right extremism is a growing problem in the United States. Attacks by radical right 
organizations are increasing and represent a significant portion of all domestic terror incidents. 
However, current approaches to deal with far-right extremism are failing and require a different 
approach to address this problem. A potential solution to stymie future attacks would be to shift 
the way that police departments are conducting their operations. A community-oriented policing 
(COP) strategy would allow law enforcement to target extremists in a way that fosters positive 
relationships with communities as well as gain critical intelligence and insight into these radical 
movements. This paper develops the foundations for future research by examining a foreign COP 
program that could serve as a model for a U.S.-based COP program. In addition, this paper 
investigates the costs and benefits of shifting to a COP strategy. 
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Introduction 
 On August 12th, 2017, white supremacists, militia groups, and various other extremist 
organizations gathered in Charlottesville, Virginia in an attempt to unite the white nationalist 
movement and protest the removal of confederate statues (Thompson, Winston & Graham, 
2017). It drew hundreds of counter-protestors from evangelical groups, civil rights groups and 
anti-fascist groups. The event turned deadly as James Fields (alleged to be aligned with white 
supremacist groups) rammed his vehicle into the surrounding crowd, injuring dozens of people 
and resulting in the death of Heather Heyer (Thompson, Winston & Graham, 2017). 
Representing the largest public gathering of far-right extremists in decades, the “Unite the Right” 
rally was a visible representation of the size and strength of the far-right movement in the United 
States. The rally drew national headlines and attention to far-right extremist activities, which are 
on the rise across the nation (Bergen et. al, 2018; Jones, 2018; Parkin et. al, 2017). Due to its 
domestic nature, police departments have a vital role in combatting this trend and must find 
innovative ways to adapt to this growing threat. In light of this, this paper prescribes community-
oriented policing (COP) as a potential strategy for police departments in their pursuit to tackle 
far-right extremism. For the purposes of this paper, far-right extremism encompasses movements 
that are rooted in white supremacist ideology (e.g. neo-Nazis), as well as anti-government 
sentiments (e.g. sovereign citizens) (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.) 
The Rising Threat of Far-Right Extremism   
Before the September 11th attacks, police departments paid minimal attention to 
terrorism, believing it to be a “remote possibility” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, p.4). 
However, once the attacks occurred, police departments radically redirected their focus to 
prioritize counter-terrorism operations in a concentrated nationwide effort to prevent future terror 
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attacks (Byman, 2018). They poured significant resources and expertise into upgrading 
intelligence capabilities, employing complex detection technologies, incorporating military-
grade equipment and more (Rizer & Hartman, 2011). However, many argue that a 
disproportionate amount of resources has been diverted to combating international jihadi 
terrorism (Byman, 2018). This has been compounded by the Trump administration’s policy 
decisions to focus exclusively on combating Islamic extremism (Ainsely, Cooke, & Volz, 2017). 
These policy decisions have resulted in a substantial gap in law enforcement’s ability to combat 
domestic, far-right terrorism (German & Robinson, 2018).  
This lack of attention on domestic terrorism is unjustified and mistaken, considering the 
consistent increase of domestic terror incidents. According to data compiled by the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) [2017, p.5], 
between 2000 and 2016, there was a “sharp increase in the proportion of attacks carried out by 
right-wing extremists (from 6% to 35%).” This is supported by data collected from the Anti-
Defamation League (2017), showing that far-right terror incidents are increasing and near peak 
levels (see Figure 1). Although jihadi-inspired attacks represent the largest proportion of terrorist 
attacks in the United States, the mere fact that far-right terrorism has been a growing trend 
should be a cause for concern. The evidence is clear—the number of far-right attacks have been 
increasing and will likely continue to increase due to a variety of factors. In particular, the 
growth of social media allows different organizations to coordinate and use recruits and funds in 
innovative ways (START 2017, Jones, 2018; Parkin et. al, 2017). Seeing that far-right extremism 
is a growing domestic problem, it is essential to encourage the participation of law enforcement 
in addressing it. Police departments must be encouraged and enabled to devote appropriate 
resources in response to this urgent threat.  
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To effectively combat far-right terrorism, law enforcement needs to undergo a 
reorientation surrounding police practices. Due to the overwhelming focus on combating 
international terrorism, police departments often have few resources (if any) to devote to 
combating far-right terrorism, rendering it a low priority issue (German & Robinson, 2018). The 
Trump administration’s decision to nullify, delay, and significantly reduce grants to combat far-
right extremism compounds this imbalance (Ainsely, Cooke, & Volz, 2017); it is now far more 
difficult for departments to collaborate with third-party organizations (Zanona, 2017). 
Furthermore, officers often lack the necessary training to identify and respond to extremism. 
According to investigative journalism conducted by ProPublica, very few police departments 
teach new recruits about hate crimes, and those that do teach them in a cursory manner (2017).  
However, even with few resources and time to dedicate to combating far-right extremism, a 
survey of 350 officers representing 175 state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies 
conducted by START revealed, “86 percent of respondents agree[d] or strongly agree[d] that 
sovereign citizens was a serious terrorist threat” (Rivinius, 2014, p.3). Comparatively, 67 percent 
agreed or strongly agreed that Islamic terrorist was a serious terrorism threat. This contrasts with 
previous survey data where police officers considered Islamic extremists to pose the greatest 
threat to the safety of their communities (see Figure 2). Even though resources are lacking, 
police departments are largely aware of the impact of far-right terrorism.  
However, the media focuses predominately on international terrorism. According to an 
analysis of data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), terror attacks by Muslims received 
3.57 times more coverage than non-Muslim terrorists (Kearns, Betus, & Lemieux, 2018). Since 
9/11, the perception that Muslims are the greatest terror threat to the United States is ingrained 
into the American psyche (Kearns, Betus & Lemieux, 2018). Furthermore, researchers using the 
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GTD data argue that events that reflect stereotypes (e.g. all Muslims are terrorists) are 
newsworthy because they confirm pre-existing biases. This is reflected by the media’s hesitancy 
to label offenders like Dylann Roof domestic terrorists, out of fear of backlash from conservative 
observers (Reitman, 2018). The media’s heavy focus on Islamic terrorism shapes public opinion, 
making it harder to persuade policymakers that far-right extremism is a serious threat. These 
complex factors compound and have contributed to how police shape their practices, preventing 
action to tackle far-right extremism.  
Community-Oriented Policing as a General Policing Strategy   
In defining COP, there exists much variation between police departments, and a single 
definition that encapsulates it remains a challenge. Yet, the U.S. Department of Justice definition 
best captures the general description of COP: 
Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police 
services that includes aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention, 
problem-solving, community engagement, and partnerships. The community policing 
model balances reactive responses to calls for service with proactive problem-solving 
centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Community policing requires police and 
citizens to join together as partners in the course of both identifying and effectively 
addressing these issues (Fisher-Stewart, p.4, 2007) 
COP involves a merger of traditional law enforcement tactics (such as foot patrols) with 
unconventional methods like hosting canine shows, participating in public forums with local 
leaders, eating at local food establishments, and generally increasing officer-to-community 
communication. These are typically “quality of life” improvements and may appear to be of low 
priority to police officers (in comparison to investigating violent crimes) but are hugely 
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important for community members (Kurzman et. al, 2016). There have been empirical examples 
to support the success of COP, evidenced by experiments conducted in Chicago and Seattle that 
improved the citizen’s overall quality of life, fostered positive attitudes between the police and 
community, and strengthened the perception that crime had decreased (Ferreira, 1996).  
However, in terms of dealing with far-right extremism, the application of COP remains 
limited. There exists little concrete evidence that COP has been implemented as a tool to respond 
to far-right terrorism. A vast number of police departments have shied away from implementing 
COP generally, and even fewer apply such strategies in combatting far-right terrorism (Kurzman 
et. al, 2016). Nevertheless, the potential for COP to restore the trust of communities in police, as 
well as deter and prevent radical far-right extremism, exists. COP would also act as an effective 
way to bring parity between police efforts to combat international and domestic terrorism.  
Pursuing a COP model can produce a myriad of benefits, such as effectively responding 
to far-right extremism (see Figure 3). Critical intelligence is gained when there is a stable 
relationship between the community and police (Kurzman et. al, 2016). Investigators are able to 
draw upon community resources and expertise to detect potential radicalization (Stohl, 2008). 
Additionally, interviews with former police officers report that the public is “the most effective 
partner a law enforcement agency has in identifying and apprehending unknown subjects” 
(Brown, 2007, p.246). Mutual partnerships foster respect and trust among community members 
and the police, most notably by ensuring that communication is open and transparent. That is 
necessary to empower community members to voice their concerns about issues as well as refer 
other members to police resources (Stohl, 2008). This would be vital in assisting victims of 
extremist attacks, since community members could reach out to police if a crime was committed 
and seek third party victim assistance programs. Even if COP fails to deter or prevent far-right 
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extremism, its victim-centered approach (putting the needs of the victim first) could incur the 
benefit of improving relations between the police and the community and bolstering the overall 
quality of life in that community (Ferreira, 1996). For example, far-right attacks routinely target 
marginalized communities; it stands to reason that a COP strategy would aid these communities 
in recovering from those attacks. Moreover, fostering trust between the police and the 
community acts as a springboard to further community goals, as well as to strengthening public 
safety (Fisher-Stewart, 2007).   
 In addition to countering domestic terrorism, applying a COP strategy could incur the 
ancillary benefit of strengthening other areas of counter-terrorism (Weine, Younis, & Polutnik, 
2017). This is (in part) because current efforts of gathering intelligence and engaging in 
cooperative practices with Muslim communities are not as effective as they could be, because 
those communities are feeling stigmatized (Papatheodorou, 2017). Many Muslim communities 
feel that police are unfairly targeting them, feeding into a sense of distrust and an unwillingness 
to engage with police. This negatively impacts law enforcements’ ability to form partnerships 
with these communities and uncover critical intelligence that could aid in counter-terrorist 
operations. Expanding the scope of COP to cover other areas of extremism should reduce this 
stigmatization, demonstrating that law enforcement is committed to addressing hate crimes 
regardless of who commits them (Papatheodorou, 2017; Weine, Younis, & Polutnik, 2017).  
Analysis of the EXIT Programme  
Even though examples of COP combating far-right extremism in the U.S. are almost non-
existent, there are examples of successful programs that have been conducted abroad. The most 
notable and widespread is the EXIT programme which should serve as a model for future U.S. 
COP strategies. Originating during the 1980s in Norway, the Exit Programme was a broad 
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community-oriented strategy developed to respond to the growing threat of Neo-Nazi and 
separatists’ movements (Slootman & Tille 2008). An advisory group consisting of experienced 
researchers, seasoned police officers, social workers, and other professionals was created to 
develop the program. It purposely included a diversity of perspectives to develop nuanced and 
deliberate strategies to tackle radicalization. This resulted in a network of different organizations 
involved with giving support to youth and parents involved with far-right groups as well as 
“developing and disseminating knowledge and methods among professionals who work with 
youth from violent groups” (Slootman & Tille 2008, p.158). These partnerships were intended to 
support police efforts in areas in which they were not familiar with, such as children’s mental 
health.  
In terms of how police approached the program, they started by identifying at-risk youth 
(primarily aged fourteen) who were poorly educated, impoverished, who previously had a 
negative encounter with immigrants, and who are attempting to seek refuge with far-right 
extremist groups (Slootman & Tille 2008). These teens were classified as non-violent, having 
weak attachments to far-right ideology, and who are seeking guidance from father figures. In 
response, police officers under the Exit Programme were instructed to prevent youth from 
forming bonds with the extremist groups, in addition to targeting hardened adult members. This 
resulted in officers participating in preventive measures such as engaging in local youth clubs, 
hosting community forums, and forming genuine bonds with the youth and their parents. 
Officers were instructed not to act aggressively towards the youth, nor to use demeaning 
language. Instead, they were told to act in positive manner to encourage the youth to be more 
cognizant of their decisions, in hopes of diverting them from their current path. For example, a 
forty-day dialogue occurred between the police, the Neo-Nazi group Virgrid, and their children, 
 
10 
 
which resulted in an exodus of approximately sixty members. Regarding the second aspect of the 
Exit Programme, police were instructed to take harsh action towards any hardened adult 
extremists that included arresting members even for slight violations. However, officers were 
also asked to hold conversations, hoping to reveal to the members the consequences of their 
actions. This resulted in numerous far-right extremists leaving their organizations. The 
combination of both actions resulted in widespread success, eventually expanding the 
programme to Sweden and Germany (Slootman & Tille 2008). Many of these progammes have 
proven to be successful and are still in operation (Ramalingam, 2015).  
 There are a few caveats to consider in terms of whether U.S. police departments could 
successfully model the Norwegian Exit Programme. The first and most prominent is that 
Norwegian police already operate at a community level, meaning that officers already knew most 
of the youth personally (Slootman & Tille 2008). Police officers in the U.S. generally employ a 
wide variety of policing measures, such as hot-spot policing or predictive policing, but these 
strategies are not intended to foster and maintain stable relations with the community (NIJ, 
2017). This lack of existing community relations could stymie the success of COP programs 
initially, due to the time it takes to start a COP program (i.e., the training and resources required 
to adequately develop positive relations). The second issue is that the Norwegian program 
involved significant coordination with a multitude of professionals and non-profit organizations 
that specialize in dealing with at-risk youth radicalization. Even if police departments had access 
to specialized third parties, many police departments may not have the sufficient resources to 
ramp up cooperation and investment (Patil, 2018; Venkatesh, 2012).  However, these barriers are 
not insurmountable, as they require time and resources, typical of any new policy. 
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 In sum, the Exit programme reveals the potential for COP success in targeting far-right 
extremism. It has empirically reduced the number of extremists and has created positive relations 
between the community and the police. The integration of police input along with evidence-
based research allows COP models to be tailored to a specific department’s needs and wants. 
Although originating in a foreign nation, the Exit programme could, at the very least, provide 
key insights into how to develop a U.S. based COP programme.  
Obstacles in Using Community-Oriented Policing as a Terrorism Strategy  
There remain significant barriers to fully embracing COP as a policing strategy. First, 
COP is extremely resource intensive since it requires mutual participation between the police and 
the community (Fisher-Stewart, 2007). Encouraging partnerships necessitates event planning, 
redefining police procedures, and developing performance standards to ensure cooperation from 
officers, in addition to other tedious processes (Spalek, 2012). Hosting events, investing in the 
time to foster relationships, and other activities are time-consuming and could detract from other 
police work. Additionally, resources from local governments are often diverted from other needs 
to create specialized COP officers and fund projects (Fisher-Stewart, 2007). Specialized officers 
are one of the more common ways to approach COP, but can be expensive and might make it 
difficult to create consistency among officer interactions (i.e., where the same officer speaks to 
the same youth). Integrating COP generally (or even using specialized COP officers) could be a 
serious obstacle that would require time and effort to overcome – two things not easy to come by 
in modern police departments.  
 The second barrier is motivation from both the police and the community to engage in 
COP. The desire from police departments to embrace COP is mixed (Kurzman et.al, 2016). 
Reluctance stems from its time-consuming nature, along with the potential for mistakes and 
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misunderstanding. Policing is a stressful process, thus attempting to develop genuine 
relationships while remaining on guard can often feel overwhelming (Kurzman et. al, 2016). 
Compounding that is the ‘us vs. them’ mentality from many police departments that believe that 
there is an inherent divide between the police and the community (Murray, 2005). This belief 
encourages officers to view the community as separate from them, which creates the conditions 
for mutual distrust. If officers are perceived as unwilling to foster genuine relationships with the 
community, then partnerships will tend to fall apart, rendering COP ineffective (Fisher-Steward, 
2007). On the other hand, if communities are unwilling to form partnerships then police efforts 
will be futile. This is true for communities that have had negative past experiences with police, 
particularly those that are reclusive and have a genuine distrust towards the police such as 
sovereign citizens (Kurzman et. al, 2016).  
In addition to internal factors, there are external considerations that need to be addressed 
in order to proceed with COP. One consideration would be to determine the types of 
communities that police should focus on (i.e., those most worthy of limited time and resources). 
For example, communities such as sovereign citizens are inherently hostile to government 
agencies and rarely come into contact with police (SPLC, n.d.). These groups are typically 
located in exceptionally rural areas because of their extreme unwillingness to cooperate with 
police which also poses a risk for unnecessary escalation that could result in injury or death 
(Kurzman et. al, 2016). There have been numerous incidents of routine traffic stops involving 
sovereign citizens turning deadly (Dickson, 2014). However, as seen in Exit Programme, 
building relations with extremist organizations (such as radical skinheads) in a suburban 
neighborhood would appear to be a feasible task. 
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 Another consideration would be to ensure that police are not perceived as being overly 
friendly with far-right movements. Hosting community events with people who are known 
racists may inflame the general public, since it could be perceived as police departments being 
sympathetic to or attempting to curry favor with these organizations. This would be extremely 
detrimental, especially given current issues involving police-community relations with minority 
communities (Reitman, 2018). Officers cannot afford to lose the confidence of the general 
public. 
 Recommendations  
In order to effectively combat far-right extremism in the U.S., police departments should 
consider the following recommendations: 
• Selectively Incorporate Community-Oriented Policing: Incorporating COP has 
been shown to be a useful way to reduce the risk of radicalization, thus preventing 
domestic attacks (Slootman & Tille 2008). Officers have had success using 
“canine shows, SWAT team demonstrations, and national night out celebrations” 
to persuade far-right groups to abandon their ways (Kurzman et. al, 2016, p.32). 
Even if officers are unable to directly form relationships with far-right extremists, 
they could form relationships with surrounding community members who could 
then give tips and inform the police of suspicious activity. However, due to 
limited time and resources, police departments are not likely capable of using 
COP as a strategy for every type of far-right extremist group. Decentralized far-
right groups, with members geographically located in suburban areas, are easier to 
form partnerships with than extremists that are located in extremely rural areas 
(e.g. sovereign citizens). Additionally, it would be a waste of valuable resources 
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to devote time and effort to groups that are too radical to form stable partnerships 
with (such as the Oath Keepers, a notorious anti-government organization) 
(SPLC, n.d). The determination would be up to local police departments, since 
they could make the most accurate analysis of their surrounding communities. 
Regarding funding, departments could overcome this barrier if they were to seek 
grants from organizations such as the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services. Furthermore, it could be speculated that success breeds success, 
therefore if a program was shown to be effective in combating far-right terrorism 
or in restoring community relations even partially, it could prove to be an impetus 
for the government to devote more resources to COP there and elsewhere.  
• Create Motivational Opportunities for Officers: As identified earlier, one 
barrier to the implementation of COP programs can be a lack of motivation on 
behalf of police officers to foster relations with the community and participate in 
events (Kurzman et. al, 2016). Therefore, to foster an environment where officers 
want to implement COP, police departments ought to find ways to incentivize 
officer participation. Police officers who choose to engage in community events 
should be rewarded with stipends, promotions, and/or other benefits. Furthermore, 
empirical studies have shown that officers engaged in COP are more satisfied 
with their jobs than officers engaged in crime-controlled policing (Halsted, 
Bromley, Cochran, 2000; Green, 1989). Therefore, even if officers are initially 
hesitant to engage in COP, as time passes they will be more likely to appreciate 
the work that they are doing and thus will support initiatives to foster relations 
with the community.  
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• Develop Specialized Training and Awareness Curriculums: Consistent 
throughout the literature has been an emphasis on utilizing training and awareness 
programs to facilitate effective communication between police and the 
community. Training programs must be clear, concise, unbiased, non-ideological, 
and based on empirical evidence. This is to ensure that officers are retaining 
information and also to avoid making officers feel like their personal beliefs are 
being attacked, which is especially true for regions such as the South where 
officers have a greater tendency to reject applying the terrorism label to certain 
extremist groups, particularly radical anti-abortionists (Kurzman et. al, 2016). 
Thus, it is vital to train officers to separate any sympathy with the terrorist 
organization’s beliefs from the organization’s commission of actual criminal acts 
(Chermak, Freilich, & Shemtob, 2009). Resources are available from the Anti-
Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law Center that could help in 
developing programs.  
• Upgrade and Monitor Intelligence Capabilities: As a prerequisite to effective 
COP, police departments must have sufficient intelligence to identify who lives in 
what communities (Kurzman et. al, 2016). If a police officer cannot identify a 
community member (and whether or not they belong to a far-right organization), 
then how can they deter or prevent far-right extremism from occurring? Thus, 
departments should make a greater effort to track and record members of 
extremist groups, including working with researchers and other government 
agencies to coordinate data. This could include simple observations such as 
noticing the terminology used by a community member (e.g. the use of the phrase 
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“sovereign citizen”) as well as viewing signs and bumper stickers that could 
indicate ideology. Departments could incorporate the use of informants, a strategy 
that has shown to be effective in some situations, such as the arrests of the 
Washington State Militia in the 1990s (Chermak, Freilich, & Shemtob, 2009). 
Departments should also use informal word of mouth to identify relationships in 
the community.  
Alternatives to Community-Oriented Policing  
As with any policy problem, there are a variety of different methods to solve the issue. 
For example, some experts have argued that current laws are insufficient to deal with domestic 
terrorism, and instead new laws need to be created (McCord, 2018). This could be in the form of 
a statute directly criminalizing domestic terrorism, yet there already exists a robust legal 
framework that can be employed.1 Furthermore, the creation of such a statute could undermine 
civil liberties and adversely target nonviolent protestors (German and Robinson, 2018); there is 
evidence that federal law enforcement officers target left-leaning activists such as 
environmentalists protesting the construction of new pipelines or political protesters that argue 
for an end to police brutality (German, 2018).  
Another option would be for police to adopt a more aggressive approach, similar to “zero 
tolerance” policing that seeks to crack down on far-right extremists. However, such an approach 
has previously resulted in backlash that emboldened far-right groups (Reitman, 2018). For 
example, former secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano developed 
a comprehensive report in partnership with the FBI, detailing the growing threat from far-right 
                                                          
1 Prosecutors do not charge suspected terrorists with the crime “domestic terrorism” but rather employ a variety of 
different laws that target the method and motive. This could include conspiracy to commit murder, murder, 
racketeering, the unlawful possession of a firearm, hate crime laws and more (German, 2018).   
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extremism (Reitman, 2018). Unfortunately, that document was leaked to conservative radio hosts 
and anti-government organizations, who encouraged a rally of support from far-right groups, 
arguing that the government was plotting against conservatives. In addition, it is highly possible 
that aggressive policing toward extremist factions would result in negative counteractions that 
could incur more police deaths. There have been multiple documented incidents of routine traffic 
stops turning violent due to sovereign citizens rejecting police legitimacy (Dickson, 2014). 
Encouraging police to conduct aggressive policing in routine situations such as these could incite 
further violence. Furthermore, aggressive tactics would likely involve SWAT units and other 
forms of militarized policing. This is problematic, as there is evidence that militarized policing 
not only fails to reduce crime or provide increased safety, it incurs negative reactions from the 
public (Mummol, 2018). Observing military-like police vehicles in local neighborhoods gives 
the perception of an authoritarian police presence, diminishing community-police relations.  
                                               Conclusion 
This paper provides a foundation for future COP researchers to use, but there remains 
much more to learn about COP’s role in combatting domestic terrorism. Future research could 
expand upon the intricacies of developing a counter-terrorism specific COP program, perhaps in 
collaboration with a specific police department (e.g., New York City’s Police Department, which 
has implemented multiple efforts that could be considered part of a COP strategy) (NYPD, n.d.). 
As discussed, COP could allow police departments to start focusing on the root causes of 
extremism while avoiding other alternatives that would produce more harm than good. From 
Charlottesville to the more recent Pittsburgh synagogue shooting, far-right terror attacks are 
growing. Action must be taken, and COP could be effective in diverting at-risk youth from being 
recruited as well as intervening to prevent adult members from committing future crimes. Even if 
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COP fails as a preventative strategy, it would at least be a step forward in remedying to the 
current distrust that exists between police and the community (Papatheodorou, 2017).  
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Appendix  
 
Figure 1. Far-Right Terror Incidents in the United States 
Source: Anti-Defamation League (2017). This data consisted of acts, attempted acts, plots of deadly 
terrorist incidents (i.e., incidents where someone was injured or killed), and non-deadly terror incidents 
over a 23-year period.  
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Figure 2. Police Perceptions of Terrorist Threats 
Source: START (2017). This survey consisted of 350 officers representing 175 state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies and compared the results from a 2006-2007 survey to a 2013-2014 survey (both 
conducted by START). The left axis represents a mean score of a 4-point scale (1=strongly disagree to 
4=strongly agree) and the (rank order) of officer concerns (Rivinius, 2014). 
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Figure 3. The potential benefits of a community-oriented policing strategy geared towards 
combating far-right extremism  
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